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JOHN E. DONALDSON

Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to
Virginia's Wills Statutes
PART ONE
T HE Executive Committee ofLhe Virginia Bar Association in 1975 requested the Committee on Wills,
Trusts and Estates to undertake a study of substantive law and procedure in Virginia relating to succession to property and the administration of estates. It
was expected that the study would focus on the propriety of Virginia's adopting the Uniform Probate
Code. In 197H the Committee on Wills, Trusts and
Estates determined that adoption of the U.P.C. as a
whole was not warranted . It also determined to con·
tinue its examination of the adequacy of Virginia law
and procedure relating to matters covered by the
U.P.C. with a view to making appropriaterecommendations to the EXl'cutive Committee as needed revisions were identified. The Committee's ongoing efforts
in this regard have contrihuted importantly to the
enactment of recent legislation involving such matters as the inheritance rights of children, multiple
party accounts, family support allowances and exemptions and the disposition of community property.
The Committee now has under consideration a
number of proposed statutory changes pertaining to
the execution, interpretation, construction and revocation of wills. These proposals were developed hy a
subcommittee which studied Virginia case and statutory law in areas covered by Article 2, Parts i) through
9, of the V.P.C. The Committee intends to complete its
consideration of these proposals and make appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee
prior to the 1984 session of the General Assembly.
This article, which is to be published in two parts, is
intended to inform the bar of the proposed changes
and to invite comments and suggestions. Tn the discussion that follows, the prImary focus is the ade-
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quacy of Virginia statutory law governing the devolution of a testator's estate where the testator has not
expressed his intent sufficiently. The principal func·
tion ofthe statutes examined is the implementation of
the intent that the testator is presumed to have had in
a number of different situations. These statutes thus
reflect legislative guessing as to the probable desires
of the "typical" testator in the situations addressed.
A. D('at h of t h(' leRalee or d('lIisee prior to the
death of the testator.

Jn well-drafted wills the circumstance of a named
beneficiary predeceasing the testator is usually ad·
dressed by conditioning the bequest or devise upon
the legatee surviving the testator. Often an alternate
taker is designated. Where a will fails to address the
circumstance of a legatee predeceasing the testator,
the legacy, upon such occurrence and absent a stat·
ute, lapses or fails, thus falling into the residue or
passing by intestacy. Statutes, commonly referred to
as "anti-lapse" statutes, have been enacted in most
states to "save" the legacy to a predeceasing legatee.
This is typically accomplished by providing that the
legacy is to pass to the issue of the deceased legatee.
The Virginia anti-lapse st.atute, § 64.1-64, is defi·
cient in several respects, especially given that the
purpose of an anti-lapse statute is to implement the
presumed intent of a te::;tator where a devisee or lega·
tee predeceases the testator. First, the Virginia statute
is deficient in providi ng anti·lapse protection as to all
devisees and legatees who predecease the testator and
leave issue who survive the testator. In the case of a
testator who has children by a prior marriage and a
second spouse who also has children by a prior mar·
riage, a legacy to the spouse, not conditioned on sur·
vivorship, would, where the spouse predeceases the
testator, pass to the issue of the deceased spouse
under the Virginia statute, to the exclusion of the
testator's own issue by his prior marriage. Presuma·
bly, the testator would have preferred the bequest to
pass to his issue (through intestacy or perhaps under
a residuary clause) rather than to the issue of his
spouse.

Second, under tlw Virginia statute a hequest to an
unrelated legatee \>vho predeceases the testator survived hy descendants may pass to such person's descendants. It is, of COllrse, difLicult to estimate the
course of succession that a testator may have preferred when' an unrelated legatee prl'deceases him.
Most states that have addressed the issue have presumed that the te::;tator would not have preferred to
"save" a kgacy to a predeceasing unrelated legatee
and in effect provide that such a legac~1 falls into the
residup or pass('s b.v intestacy. In a 1!el(iO survey (see
46 U. \ '(1 . I,. NI't'. H99), it was detl'rmined that ;37
states requirpd the predpceasing legatpp to have he en
related to t1w testator hefore their anti-lapse statutes
became applicable and that only nin(' state::;, including Virginia, had statute::; that were applicable in the
ca::;c of predeceasing unrelated legatees. Alsl), given
that where a legatee i::; related to thl' testator family
tie::; and family interests are likely to be the motivating forces underlyi ng the legacy, the application of an
anti -lapse statute where the legatee predeceases the
decedent has the effect of preventing a "branch" of
the family frum heing penalized solely because of the
death of a member (usually the "Iwad") of the branch.
In this regard, thp anti-lapse statute functions in
much the way that the statute of intestate succession
functions wlwn an heir apparent dies leaving issue
surviving. llowewr, tIll' motiv(' of friendship which
presumably underlies most lpgacies to non-relatives i::;
less likely to he coupled with "family" considerations
of the kind that undprlie legacips to relatives and the
testator is less likply to he concprt1ed ahout protecting
the "family" of an intpnded unrelatpd legatee from
the untimely death uf such intended legatee. Although
not frpe of doubt, it is submitted that the majority
approach, which is also reflected in U.P.C. § 2-(:;0,\
best approximates the presumed intent of a testator in
requiring that the pn·deceasecl legatpe be related in
a particular degree to the testator before an anti-lapse
statute will be applicable. In this regard, the approach
of the U.P.C. in defining relatedness in terms of descent from a grandparent, while arhitrary, is nonetheless reasonahle in that it emhracps kindred through
first cousins, including first ('ousins severn I times
removpd, but f'xcludps tl1f' more distant relatives who
are lpss likPly to have genuine "family" Donds with
the decedent.
Another dpjicipncy in the anti-lapse statute, ~ G4.1l14, arises from a 1~l~O anwndment that sought to
appl~' the statute to testamentary pourovprs to trusts
having- rt'nmindernll'n who predecPClspd the testator.
This problem will be addressed in the second installment of this artidt'.
A minor ddiC'ienc~' in the statuti> lies in its structure
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and relationship to other rl'ievani provisions. The last
sentpnce of S 64.1-fl4, in trpating thp circulllstances IIf
tlw ocath of 0111' of several n>siduary legatpps without
issue surviving, more appropriately hplongs in ~ 64.16;3, which is discussed helow.
Set forth in the ApPf'ndix are proposals (1) and (2)
which would impleml'nt thesl' recommendations by
appropriate amendmen ts to ~ G4 .1-fj ·l alld ~ G4 .1-1l!1.
R. Fui/ure of testomentor)' provisions.

Minor changes in statutory law are needed to better
provide for the disposition of bequests and devises
that are not saved by the anti-lapse statute. For
example, what hecomes of a legacy or devise to a
beneficiary who predeceased the testator without
issue surviving,! In suhstance, Virginia law closely
parallels U.p.('. ~ 2-1101l. Both treat lapsed legacies as
falling into the residul'. Also, hoth treat residuary

legacies to two or more persons as not subject to partial failure by reuson of the death of one legatee v·lit.hout issue surviving'. Such a death is treated as
pnlarging the shares of the other residuary le!':utees
rather than resulting in partial intestacy.
The Virginia statutes setting forth this treatment,
which is helieved sound, are ~ 64.1·61 (last sentence)
and ~ 61.1·65. As has heen noted above, the last sentence of~ 64.1-61 more appropriately belongs in § 64.1 ·
(;S. That latter section, in its present format, is
misleading in thai it addresses only the question of
the d isposi iion of lapsed devises and leaves the
ancient principles of the common law to furnish the
rule that fuiled legacies fall into the residue. Tn the
interpsts of darity, the treatment of failed legacips
should also he addressed in the statute.
Proposal (2), set forth in the Appendix, presents
dmft legislation which, if adopted, would implement
these re{'omm('ndations.
C. Heuil'a/ o( (orm('r lrills; ('(frct of rf'l'o('ulion
of later ll'ill.
An issue on which American jurisdictions are
widely divided involves the question of the proper
treatment of an parlier will where a tpstator executes
a later will which purports to revoke the former, and
t11(~ later wi II is i tsel f revoked. [n such ci rcumstances
dops the former will thereby hccome operative at
death'! Three basic approaches have heen followed. A
large numlwr of jurisdictions, including those which
have adopted the UP.c., apply various rebuttable
presumptions as to whether the decedent intended the
former will to be operative upon the revocation of the
lat.er and permit extrinsic evidence t.o establish intent.
This approach has been criticized by commentators
as violative of the spirit of wiUs acts in inviting the
use ufparul evidence to establish testamentary intent
A small number of jurisdictions follow a second
approach which is sometimes referred to as the com·
mon law rule of "automatic revivaL" This approach,
which is rather mechanistic, is based un the principle
that a will does not "speak" until death and a later
will which purports to revoke an eariiN will has no
l"ffeci on the earlier will if it, thl~ later will , is revoked.
Th us the f(~vo('ation of a revoki ng \vill pn'ven ts the
revoking will from speaking language of revocation
and as a C'onseq uence the l'arliL'r will is not revoked.
This "automatic revival" approach has tlw advan·
t.age of ccrt.ainty , but it is questionable \,>'hether it
accuratel.y reflects the testamentary' wishes of the
decedents i nvnl ved.
A third approach ohsprvcd in a number of jurisdictions approximates that employed in Section :2:2 oftlw
English \".li1ls Act of 1H:l7. Un Lipr that Act. there is no

revival of an earlier will hy reusnn of the revocation of
a later will and revival occurs only by the reexl'cution
of the earlier will or by a codiril expressing an intent
to revive the parlier. The purpnse uf the Ad was to
reverse by statute the "common 1m"," rule that
resulted in automatic revival ofthe first will upon the
revocation of the second. Since only a "revoked" will
can he "revived," the Act presumes that the revoca·
tion of the first will occurs at the timp of execution of
the second, which revokes tlw first expressly or by
implication, and not when t.he spcond will "speaks" at
the dl-'ath of the decedent. That under the Act the
sccond will revokes the first will at the time of execu·
tion of the second will was ('on firmed hy the English
j udici nry in I H4:j in Major v. \-\lilliam8.:1 Curl. '\:12, 163
Eng. Rep. 781. The English upproach thus employs
the concept of automatic non·revival of a first will
upon the revocation of the second and has the virtue
of eliminating resort to parol or extrinsic evidence.
For a listing of the states that fall into each of the
three main groupings of American responses to the
revival issue, see the Commen'. 4~J Denver 1.. ,I. 593
(197::l).

The current condition of Virginia law with respect
to this issue is derived from strained and convoluted
statutory interpretation and is much in need of revi·
sion. The applicah1p Virginia statutes appear to place
Virginia in the third grouping of states, those which
follow th!' I';nglish Wills Act of 1H:17 and its rule of
"automatic non·revivaL" Tlowpver, thp Virginia Suo
preme Court, by construction, has placpd the state in
t.he second grouping, \vhich follows the rule of "auto·
matic revivaL" How this came about is most unusual.
Hoth the Virginia rpvl)cat.ion statutl', ~ (-i4. I .;)1-\, and
the Virginia revival statute, ~ 6·1.1·(){), an~, in all rna·
terial respects, identical to counterpart provisions of
the English \Vills Act of U~:17, both being lirst adopted
in this Stutl' in I fl4!). Thf' H('porl of th(' Hf'l ,i,wlrs o( the
('it'll ('ode oj" VirRinia (1 H'H)) states at pagp 62;3:
The late F:nglish statute of wills ... intro·
duced some'''valuahle improvements .... \Ve
have adopted nearly t.he whole of the st.atute,
for double reasons that Wl' approve its provi·
siems, and that tlw adoption hen' of thost'
provisions "\vi II givt' us tilt' IlPnpfit of the Eng·
lish decisions upon them ...
Presumahly, the codl' revisors in lH,'\9 were aware
that the English judiciary had, in I Hcl:l, construL'd the
English \Vills Ad in the ma!1lwr indicated above, and
that under that Act the execution of a spcond will
revoking the first is the event at which revocation of
tllt' first. occurs. Presumably, tlw revisors were also
awarp that till' purpose of till' Act was to n'Vl'rSL' the
common Im.v rulp that a s!'cond rt'voking will, if itself

revoked, ncv er "spcaks" to revoke th e first will.
The Virginia legislation of 1H49 was not construed
untill ~77 , wlwre in Hu(l/sillv . Rhude::; , 70 Va. In, the
court, expressly relying on English precedent, Major
v. Ifilliam,'; , supra, held, in aCnJrdanre with legislative history and purpose, that tlw rpvocation of a
second will does not operate to ]'('vive a first will.
None of the twelve staU' s which deri ve their law from
the English Wills Act have held oth erwise in cases
where the second wi II e x pres ~.;ly l'I'vokps the first. 1\ or
is any distinction usu a lly drawn in these states
between second \vills whirh revoke the lirst f'xpressly.
and those which l'l· voke the first b.v implication
through inconsistpIH'.v. Set' I'age O il IVills (RoweParker Revision, I 96()), Vol. 2, p. ,1·H.
Although Virginia . hy statute, appears aligned
with t he " cone! usi VP I))'PSU m pI ion of non-revival "
position of the English Wills Act of 1H:n, the alignment changed in I ~J :lH . [n P()indexter v. JOlles, 200 Va.
372, lOG S.E. 2d 1,14 (1 ~):lH), t.he court distinguished
between second wills rpvokinj..( the first b:v express
revocation clausl' and second wills revoking the earlier by implicat.ion arising from inconsistenl';,)' , holding, as to t1w latter, that a destruction of a secund will
merely incollsistent with the first, and not expressly
revoking it, does rlilt in fact revoke tlw first, because
the inconsistpllt. lallj..(uaj..(l' IH~v('r "speaks" in that circumstance . Thl' holding oftlw ('ourt, while perhaps at
odds with t1w lej..(islative history, has some logic in
that th e laity probably n~gard language of express
revocation to be immediately effective and could
regard bnj..(\wge of inconsistpnr,'.' to he ambulatory .
See Pa~I ' ()II tl'il/s, supra, at pagl' 4,1:1.
The rptrpat from the estahlished interpretation of
the Virginia rpvival stat.ute which began with Poin ·
dexter became an abnndonment. of I. hat interpretation
in 1'imlwrlah' (' v. Staf l' Planters Hanh, :201 Va . 9GO, 11;')
S.E . 2d :l9 ( 19fiO). There the court, as to a second will
which pxprpssly revoked a first will, and which
second will. Iwc<1use not found, was pn~sumed revoked
by physical a ct, held that tlw second will did not
"speak" at death to n' voke the first. In short, the court
held that until a will is revoked it continues in pHect
and it spcond will never revokes a first will if the
second will is it:·.;plf revoked.
As an pxprcisp in statutory' intprpretation, the
majority opinion in Timb('rlaN(, is faulty for the following reasons:
1. Linder t1w opinion, ~ fi4.I -fiO is virtually ml'an ingless as a "revival" statute. In treating a first will
as unrevoked by the express language of a second will
until the second will speaks at death, which it cannot
do if the sel'ond will is revoked, the revocation of a

second will can never present. a revival issue IwcausI'
the first will, being unrevoked, is not in Iwed of revi val. The court's attempt to find meaning in ~ £:i4.HiO
by attempting to distinguish between "declaratory"
revocations and "testamentary" revocations is specious, and based on a casf' , Rarhsda/e v . Harhsdalc, :19
Va . Cl:lil (1.'\42), decided seven years heforp Virginia
adopted the predecessor provisions to ~ h'1.1-;'}.'\ and
S 64.1-60.
2. The opinion overrules the previous statutor.',.
interpretation expressed in Rudisill v . Rhodes, supra,
by ignoring the English authority upon which that
case was decided.

:.\. The opinion results in an interpretation that is
diametrically opposed to thp purposp and intent of
S h4. L-oO as first enacted, which was to rl'VI'rse the
"common law" rule that a second will never revokes a
first will unless the second will " speaks" at death.
Kather than reading- ~ h1.1-60 to reverse the "com·
mon law" rule, the opinion, apparentl.v ohlivious to
the fact that ~ 6'1.1-i'>F; also was dprived from the Eng·
lish \Vills Act of 1.'\:17, construes ~ 0,1.1 ·,,).'\ in conjunc'
tion with ~ fi4.1-60 to restore the common law rule
that the statutes were intended to reverse.
The immediate task of determining the adequacy of
Virginia law in contrast to the approach suggested in
the LJ.P.c. thus results in thL' comparison of an emasculated, largely meaningless ~ fi·1.1 -hO with U.P.c.
S 2·!)09. The u.P.C., in inviting- the use of parol evidence to resolve the question of whether revival of t.he
earlier instrument was intended by the testator upon
till' revocation of a later wilL introduces uncertainty
t.o probate proceedings and invites the use of a kind of
evidence that is traditionally regarded as unreliahk.
The Virginia "common law" approach required under
the holding in Timher/ahl' probahly ddeats the
wishes of most testators who, having rf'voked a first
will expressly hy the terms of a spcond, revoke the
second, perhaps in the hope oflater executing a third .
To suppose that a decedent, having once expressly
repudiated a testamentary plan, would prefer that
plan to intestacy upon thf' revocation of a later will is
unrpalistic , notwithstanding legalistic implications
arising from the ambulatory character of wills. The
"common law" position, concededly, does have the
virtue, however, of makinj..( unnecessary inquiry into
the question of whether a later will may have been
executed and revoked.
Although, given t.he diven;ity of rpspectahle opin ion, the matter is not free of doubt, the approach to
" revival" reflected in the English Wills Act of IR:l7,
with slight modification, is believed preferable. Accordingl,'.', it is submitted that the propf'r response to
7

the "revival" issue requires a statutory solution
reflective of the following principles:
1. That revival of a former will by reason of the
revocation of a later will sbould occur only when the
decedent would probably have so intended, and that
resort to parol evidence to determine such intention is
Lmproper.

2. That when a second will expressly revokes a first
will it is presumed to bc the intention of the decedent
that revocation occurs upon the execution of the
second will and the latcr rcvocation of the second will
does not make the first operative.
:1. That where a later will does not expressly revoke
a former will, but is merely inconsistent with it in
whole or in part, the mere execution of the later will
does not, of itself, operate to revoke the former , and
if the later will is itself revoked, the vitality of the
earlier will continues unaffected by the provisions of
the later will. It is thus presumed, in such cases, that
an earlier will, not expressly revoked, remains viable
as a testamentary document until superseded by a
document admissible to probate upon the death of the
decedent, and not revoked prior to death. Fortunately,
eases involvin!l; the application of this principlc do
not arise often, and generally involve holographic
writings as in Poindexter v. ,Janet;. supra.
4. A will may be revived by a duly executed later
writing expressing an intention to do so.

These principles generally reflect the observations
set forth in Paw' 011 Wills. supra Vol. 2, p. 44:1, as
follows:
Most of the laity apparently believe that
the express revocation clause revokes the
first will at once, and the rule that the revocation of the second will automatically leaves
the first will in effect, frequently results in
gi ving effect to a testamentary disposition
whieh the testator had long since forgotten ,
Hnd which, if he had remembered it. he
would have thought had no legal effect.
The courts which distinguish between the
cases in which the later will has an express
revocation clause and those in which it is
merely incunsistent with the prior will,
probably come nearer to the intention of the
greater number of testators.
Legislative proposals (;~) and (-1), which amend
~ fl4.1-5H and ~ fl4.1·flO, are set forth in the Appendix
and would, if enacted. i mplemen t these recommended
changes.
The Committee on Wills, Trusts and Estates, in
considering- these recommended revisions, and those
which will be diseussed in the second installment of
this article, is mindful that succession statutes oflong
H

standing which are familiar and have well defined
meanings thruugh judicial interpretation are valua·
ble to the pu blic and the bar because of the element of
certainty they afford. However, statutes that furnish
rules of construction designed to approximate the
intent of testators whose actual intent is unexpressed
are especially deserving of periodic review, for what
may appropriately have been the presumed intent of
a typical testator in a generation past is not necessar·
ily a measure of such intent today.

Appendix
Propusal!. It is proposed that ~ 6>1.1-64 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows :
S 64.1-64. When children or descendan ts of devisee, legatee, etc. to take estate.-lJnless a contrary
inten tion shall appear in the will, if a devisee or
legatee who is a grandparent or a lineal descend·
ant of a /.,rrandparent of the testator is dead at the
time of execution of the will or fails to survive the
testator, the issue of the deceased devisee or legatee
who survive the testator take in the place of the
deceased devisee or legatee and ifthey are all ofthe
same degree of kinship to such deceased devisee or
legatee they take equally, but if of unequal degree
then those of more remote degree take by representation. One who would have been a devisee or legatee under a dass gift ifhe had survived the testator
is treated as a devisee or legatee for purposes of this
section whether his death occurred before or after
the exeeution of the will.
Prupusa12. It is proposed that § 64.1-65 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
§ 64. I-oil. How devises and bequests that fail,
etc. to pass.-lJnless a contrary intention shall
appear by the will, and except as provided in § 64.164, if a devise or bequest other than a residuary
devise or bequest fails for any reason, it hecomes a
part of the residue, and if the residue is devised or
bequeathed to two or more persons and the share of
one fails for an;' reason, such share shall pass to
the other residuary devisee or legatee or devisees or
legatees in proportion to their interests in the
residue.
Proposal 3. It is proposed that. § 64.1-58 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
~ 64.1-58. Revocation of wills generally(a) If a testator having an intent to revoke, or
som( ~ person at his direction and in his presence
cuts, tears, hurns, obliterates, cancels or destroys a
will or codicil, or the signature thereto, or some
(COlli illlWd Oil pa#.,
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(continued from page 8)

provision thereof, such will, codicil or prOVISIOn
thereof is thereby void and of no effect.
(b) If a testator executes a will or other writing in
the manner in which a will is required to be executed, and such will or other writing expressly
revokes a previous will, such previous will, including any codicil thereto, is thereby void and of no
effect.
(c) If a testator duly executes a will or codicil
which does not expressly revoke a former will, but
which expressly revokes a part thereof, or contains

28

provisions inconsistent therewith, such former will
is revoked and superseded to the extent of such
express revocation or inconsistency if the later will
becomes effectual upon the death of the testator.
Proposal 4. It is proposed that § 64.1-60 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1-60. Revival of wills.-No will or codicil, or
any part thereof which shall have become void and
of no effect under the provisions of § 64.1-58 shall
thereafter become operative otherwise than by the
reexecution thereof, or by a codicil executed in the
manner hereinbefore required, and then only to the
extent to which an intention to revive the same is
shown.

